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Abstract 
We assess the effect of securitization activity on banks’ lending rates employing a uniquely detailed 
dataset from the euro-denominated syndicated loan market. We find that, in the run up to the 2007-2009 
crisis banks that were more active at originating asset-backed securities did not price their loans more 
aggressively (i.e. with narrower lending spreads) than less-active banks. Using a unique feature of our 
dataset, we show that also within the set of loans that were previously securitized, the relative level of 
securitization activity by the originating bank is not related to narrower lending spreads. Our results 
suggest that while the credit cycle seems to have a major impact of lending standards, the effect of 
securitization activity appears to be very limited.  
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1. Introduction 
Securitization is often singled out as one of the major contributing factors to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). Specifically it has been argued that 
securitization contributed to fuel excessive risk-taking by banks by weakening their lending 
standards (Keys et al. 2011).  
 Prior to the recent global financial crisis, however, the conventional view tended to 
emphasize the positive role played by securitization in enhancing the resilience of the financial 
system. It was argued that the use of credit risk transfer instruments, such as securitization, enabled 
the largest and most sophisticated banks to divest themselves of credit risk by passing it on to 
institutions with far less leverage, mostly by dispersing credit risk across the financial system 
(Greenspan 2005). Also within the banking sector, securitization was broadly believed to be 
employed by banks to diversify their credit risk portfolio more effectively either geographically or 
by sector. As a result, securitization activity was expected to make the financial system more stable 
as risk could be more easily managed (Duffie 2008). Consistent with these views, early empirical 
evidence from before the crisis found a link between securitization and lower levels of banks’ risk. 
Banks more active in the securitization market were also found to have lower solvency risk as well 
as higher profitability [(Duffee & Zhou 2001); (Cebenoyan & Strahan 2004); (Jiangli et al. 2007)]. 
 An alternative view on securitization focused on the possible negative consequences for 
the stability of the financial system. In particular, this view argues that securitization could 
compound adverse selection and moral hazard problems in banking leading to poorer screening 
standards as well as weaker monitoring of borrowers. Mostly building on this argument, there was 
a more skeptical view on the final impact of securitization on the financial system which underlines 
that securitization would not necessarily lead to credit risk diversification, but could promote the 
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retention of risky loans by banks and undermine overall credit standards [(Greenbaum & Thakor 
1987); (Gorton & Pennacchi 1995); (DeMarzo 2005); (Instefjord 2005); (Morrison 2005); (Rajan 
2006) ; (Chiesa 2008); (Krahnen & Wilde 2008); (Parlour & Plantin 2008); (Shin 2009)]. A related 
view suggests that by making illiquid loans liquid, securitization also could enhance, other things 
being equal, banks’ risk appetite more broadly thereby endangering financial stability [(Calem & 
LaCour-Little 2004); (Ambrose et al. 2005); (Haensel & Krahnen 2007); (Wagner 2007); 
(Brunnermeier & Sannikov 2014)]. 
 Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, evidence on the link between securitization and 
bank risk-taking has grown but remains ambiguous. Part of the literature argues that banks 
resorting to securitization activity relaxed their lending standards in the years prior to the crisis 
more aggressively [(Drucker & Mayer 2008); (Mian & Sufi 2009); (Nadauld & Sherlund 2009); 
(Keys et al. 2011); (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2012); (Wang & Xia 2014)]. In contrast, Shivdasani and 
Wang (2011), Benmelech et al. (2012), Casu et al. (2013) do not find any evidence suggesting that 
securitization led to riskier lending. 
 We contribute to this literature by assessing the impact of banks’ securitization activity on 
their lending function and, in particular, on their lending rates.1 We test this link at two levels. We 
start by examining the pricing behavior of banks in the syndicated loan market by comparing banks 
active in the securitization market to those who are non-active in this market.2 This approach has 
the advantage of examining banks’ lending standards by including first-hand information on bank, 
borrower and loan conditions. This should, in turn, give an indication of banks’ changes in risk-
                                                          
1 In this paper we use pricing of loans, lending spreads and lending rates interchangeably to refer to the lending rates over libor as priced by the 
bank leading the syndicate. 
2 Syndicated lending, where two or more banks agree jointly to make a loan has evolved into one of the world’s largest financial markets. In a 
typical syndicated loan, “arranger” (or “senior”) banks are situated at the core of the process. They help to put together the deal on a given set of 
terms and sell parts of the loan to “participant” (or “junior”) second tier banks, as well as other investors, while assigning some of the loan to 
themselves. 
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taking appetite. We select a group of 406 broadly similar European banks – 94 of which were 
active in the securitization market –, and 10,911 syndicated loan deals for the period ranging from 
2000 to 2009. 
 We find that in the run up to the 2007-2009 crisis, banks that were more active at originating 
asset-backed securities did not price their loans more aggressively (i.e. with narrower lending 
spreads) than non-active banks. Our results also show that larger banks with relatively smaller 
securitization-origination programs seem to be somewhat more aggressive than other banks in their 
loan pricing. 
 In our second step we consider only those banks that are already active as originators in the 
securitization market and include only those loans that were securitized. This step aims to reduce 
possible concerns about self-selection across banks or instruments connected to securitization by 
considering only the variability within those banks that are already active in the securitization 
market, and within those loans which have been securitized. We are able to do this by using a 
unique and comprehensive dataset, not publicly available, provided by the main European Trustees 
which allows us to identify those syndicated loan transactions that were securitized. This section 
of the data is available for all euro-denominated syndicated loans issued between 2005 and 2009. 
Hence it crucially includes both the pre and crisis periods. Our final dataset includes 4,652 loan 
deals, of which 1,795 are subsequently securitized. 
 We show that, within the set of loans that were securitized, the amount of securitization 
activity by the originating bank is not related to lower loan spreads. Our results consistently suggest 
that broad credit cycle conditions seem to be far more correlated with looser credit standards 
(measured via lending rates) than banks’ securitization activity. 
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 The coverage and quality of our data constitute two significant contributions to the existing 
literature. Our sample has been obtained directly from the largest trustees operating in the 
European Union and covers the overwhelming majority of the syndicated loans issued in euro.3 
This is an important advantage, as compared to previous work, where data was limited to public 
deals reported by publicly available sources. In contrast, we are able to form a more complete 
picture of the market which includes public, as well as private deals. We also construct a large 
sample of banks from Europe (which we matched with their amount of securitization activity and 
loans granted) which allows us to control for other bank characteristics.  
 The European focus is another significant contribution of this work. The European Union 
is a useful laboratory to assess the impact of securitization on credit markets. First, the growth of 
the securitization market in the European Union has been relatively recent and swift. This allows 
us to assess more clearly the impact of this recent phenomenon (securitization) on lending 
standards. This stands in stark contrast to the United States, where the introduction of securitization 
has been much more progressive and continuous over time. In fact, securitization has been used as 
a technique for more than fifty years in the United States, while in Europe the securitization 
markets started very timidly in the late 1990s, and took off significantly only from 2004 to 2007.  
 Second, unlike in the United States, where institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac have supported the securitization market, the development of the securitization market in the 
European Union has not been driven by government-sponsored institutions.4 This is helpful for 
our purposes as the existence of government-sponsored agencies probably has an important impact 
on banks’ incentives to securitize assets in the United States.  
                                                          
3 Our coverage is estimated by the main trustees to be above 95% of all securitized deals. 
4 In the United States the market for ABS started to develop by means of government-sponsored agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a.k.a. Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, a.k.a. Freddie Mac, created in 1938 and 1968, respectively. 
These agencies enhanced mortgage loan liquidity by issuing and guaranteeing, but not originating, ABS. See Acharya et al. (2014) for a discussion. 
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 Third, the strong growth in securitization activity in the European Union coexisted with a 
very large covered bond market which provided European banks with a source of long-term market 
funding alternative to securitization (ECB 2011). In this respect, in the aftermath of the crisis, the 
set-up of a legislation supporting the covered bond market in the United States has been often 
considered [(Pollock 2011); (Marlatt & Pinedo 2013)]. Hence, our setting in an area in which both 
markets coexist provides useful evidence for countries (such as the United States) considering the 
creation of an active covered bond market. 
 Fourth, our focus on the European Union banks allows us to test the effect of securitization 
across countries. Hence our results cannot be ascribed to country specific institutional or regulatory 
features. At the same time, our decision to analyze securitization in the European Union as a whole 
seems appropriate as the introduction of the euro contributed to the creation of a single financial 
market for both euro-denominated syndicated loans and securitization activity in this region. 
 Finally, in terms of volume, securitization activity in the European Union is also 
sufficiently large both in terms of the total amount of credit securitized (Marques-Ibanez & 
Scheicher 2009) and in outstanding figures as the euro-denominated securitization market is the 
second largest in the world (Blommestein et al. 2011).5 This supports the internal validity of our 
findings in addition to providing additional evidence to the existing results from the United States. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows, Section 2 reviews the related literature 
on the effects of securitization on lending standards and risk-taking behavior. Section 3 describes 
the data sources, reports the descriptive statistics of our sample and explains the empirical 
methodology used in the analysis. The results of estimations are presented and discussed in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                          
5 In 2006, just before the financial crisis, the annual net flow of euro-denominated asset-backed-securities (ABS) was above one-fifth of the bank 
loans granted to households and non-financial companies during that year. 
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2. Literature review 
Traditional securitization can be broadly defined as the process whereby individual bank loans and 
other financial assets are bundled together into tradable securities, which are then sold on to 
investors. The development of securitization has permitted banks to “off-load” part of their credit 
exposure to outside investors thereby lowering regulatory pressures on capital requirements, and 
enabling them to raise new funds and increase lending further. The advent of securitization has 
therefore changed banks’ role progressively from traditional relationship-based lending towards 
originators and distributors of loans. This new role would be expected to have implications for 
banks’ incentives to take on new risks.6 
 In principle, the overall view prior to the 2007-2009 crisis was that securitization improved 
financial stability by smoothing out risks among many investors (Duffie 2008). Scant early 
empirical evidence also pointed in this direction. For instance Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) find 
that banks improve their ability to manage credit risk through loan sales, while Jiangli et al. (2007) 
argue that securitization increases bank profitability and reduces insolvency risk. 
 Securitization also has a direct positive impact on the quantity of loans supplied by banks. 
Loutskina and Strahan (2009) and Loutskina (2011) find that securitization reduces banks’ 
holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability, while Hirtle (2009) provides 
evidence suggesting that the use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank 
credit and lower spreads for large corporate borrowers. For Europe, Altunbas et al. (2009) 
conclude that banks active in the securitization market also seem to supply more loans. 
                                                          
6 Rapid developments in securitization markets altered banks’ role. Banks have long been recognized as “special” because of their ability to act as 
intermediaries between borrowers and depositors and transform illiquid assets into liquid deposit contracts. Conventionally, bank lending was 
typically conducted on the basis of a bank extending a loan to a borrower, holding the loan on their balance sheet until maturity and monitoring the 
borrower’s performance along the way. In this relationship-based model, banks reduced idiosyncratic risks mainly through portfolio diversification 
and performed the role of delegated monitors for less informed investors [(Diamond 1984); (Ramakrishnan & Thakor 1984); (Bhattacharya & 
Chiesa 1995); (Holmstrom & Tirole 1997)]. 
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 Other studies questioned the effect of securitization on the screening and monitoring 
incentives of banks. The theory of financial intermediation has placed special emphasis on the role 
of banks in monitoring and screening borrowers thereby mitigating moral hazard between 
borrowers and lenders [(Diamond 1984); (Fama 1985); (Boyd & Prescott 1986)]. By creating 
informational “distance” between the loan’s originator and the bearer of the loan’s default risk, 
securitization can potentially reduce lenders’ incentives to carefully screen and monitor borrowers 
(Petersen & Rajan 2002). As a result, some researchers associate loan sales and securitization to 
looser credit monitoring incentives by banks [(Gorton & Pennacchi 1995); (Duffee & Zhou 2001); 
(Morrison 2005); (Chiesa 2008); (Parlour & Plantin 2008)]. 
 Part of the most recent empirical literature questioned whether securitization activity makes 
the acquisition of further risk more attractive for banks. In this direction, in Europe Krahnen and 
Wilde (2008) report an increase in the systemic risk of banks after securitization and Michalak and 
Uhde (2013) show that securitization has a negative impact on banks' financial soundness. Goderis 
et al. (2007) find that a bank increases its loan-to-asset ratio following the first issuance of a 
collateralized loan obligation (CLO),7 while Instefjord (2005) highlights that when the bank has 
access to a richer set of tools to manage risk than before, it behaves more aggressively in acquiring 
new risks. Haensel and Krahnen (2007) find also that activity in the European collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO) market enhances the risk appetite of the bank making use of securitization. 
Looking at the pricing of securitized loans, Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) show that securitized 
loans were priced 17 basis points lower than un-securitized ones. 
 Higher risk appetite is also related to the possibility of undertaking regulatory capital 
arbitrage by banks. In this respect, securitization has often been used by banks to lower their 
                                                          
7 Foos et al. (2010) show that bank loan growth leads to higher bank risk, including a worsening of the risk-return structure and worse (i.e. lower) 
bank solvency. 
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regulatory needs for costly equity capital charges related to their loan book, thereby reducing their 
overall cost of financing (Watson & Carter 2006). At the same time, banks may have an incentive 
to securitize less risky loans thereby increasing their risk profile for a given level of capital (Calem 
& LaCour-Little 2004). This behavior derives from the existence of capital requirements which 
might induce banks to exploit the benefits of securitizing assets in order to undertake regulatory 
capital arbitrage. Through securitization banks can potentially increase capital adequacy ratios 
without decreasing their loan portfolios’ risk exposure. In other words, banks may securitize less 
risky loans and keep the riskier ones. Ambrose et al. (2005) show that securitized loans 
experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in banks’ balance sheets. In this direction 
Albertazzi et al. (2015) showed that in Italy banks can effectively counter the negative effects of 
asymmetric information in the securitization market by selling less opaque loans via signaling or 
by building up a reputation for not undermining their own lending standards. 
 While risk sharing within the financial sector (through securitization and derivatives 
contracts) contributes to diversify risks, it can also amplify bank risks at the systemic level 
(Brunnermeier & Sannikov 2014). Allen and Carletti (2006) show that credit risk transfer could 
produce a reduction of welfare the promulgation of contagion at the systemic level. Wagner (2007) 
shows that the greater liquidity of bank assets achieved through securitization, paradoxically, 
increases banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures as banks have 
stronger incentives to take on new risks. The reason is that securitization makes crises less costly 
for banks and, as a result, banks have an incentive to take on new risks offsetting the positive direct 
impact of securitization on bank stability. 
9 
 
 In sum, this strand of the literature argues that securitization does not necessarily lead to 
unlimited risk transfer and could undermine banks’ monitoring incentives. Hence, it may weaken 
financial stability.  
 Following the 2007-2009 crisis, empirical evidence examining the relationship between 
securitization and risky lending practices has expanded but remains ambiguous and mostly focused 
on the United States. Keys et al. (2011) show that banks that resorted to securitization activity in 
the years prior to the crisis seem to have relaxed lending standards by more. Nadauld and Sherlund 
(2009) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) link the sub-prime mortgage crises to a sharp decline in 
lending standards in the United States. This decline was more prevalent in areas with higher 
mortgage securitization origination (Mian and Sufi, 2009).  
 Other studies do not find such evidence. For example, Benmelech et al. (2012) investigate 
whether securitization was associated with risky lending in the corporate loan market by examining 
the performance of individual loans held by collateralized loan obligations. They find that loans 
securitized before 2005 performed no worse than comparable non-securitized corporate loans 
originated by the same bank. Shivdasani and Wang (2011) argue that an increase in securitization 
did not lead to riskier leveraged buyouts. Casu et al. (2013) conclude that the net impact of 
securitization on the risk-taking behavior of issuing banks, and consequently on the soundness of 
the banking system, is ambiguous and will depend on the structure of the transaction. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
We start our analysis at the bank level by considering whether banks active in the securitization 
market were pricing similar loans differently than non-active banks using evidence from the 
syndicated loan market. In other words, we examine if banks making greater use of the 
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securitization market were more aggressive in their loan pricing. Hence we use the pricing of newly 
extended loans (measured as the spread charged) as a potential proxy for banks’ credit standards 
after securitization. 
 Building on earlier literature we include loan spread at the loan level so we model loan i 
by bank b at time t, as a function of a number of factors [(Carey & Nini 2007); (Ivashina 2009)], 
where loan spread is measured as the spread on basis points over LIBOR.8 We use the all-in drawn 
spread (AISD) which measures the interest rate spread plus any associated fees charged to the 
borrower.9 Thus, AISD is an all-inclusive measure of loan price which is expected to depend on 
borrower, loan and macroeconomic characteristics as well as a variable accounting for the intensity 
of securitization activity (see below). We estimate the following model: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 × 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 +𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
 �𝛽𝛽ℎ × 𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠ℎ,𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 ×𝑆𝑆−1
𝑠𝑠=1
𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ×𝐾𝐾−1
𝑘𝑘=1
𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 ×𝐿𝐿−1
𝑙𝑙=1
𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 ×𝑌𝑌−1
𝑦𝑦=1
𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  
 
 
We utilize two set of alternative variables to proxy for the securitization activity of banks: 
                                                          
8 Note that syndicated loans typically carry floating rates that are priced over LIBOR usually in 6 month intervals. Re-pricing is done in relation 
to changes in LIBOR and the spread remains the same, reflecting the risk of both deal and borrower. 
9 See e.g. Sufi (2007), Ivashina (2009), and Bharath et al. (2011). 
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1. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if a bank securitized any assets in the year when 
the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. This variable measures the immediate impact of a 
bank’s securitization activity on loan pricing. 
2. We calculate two dummy variables using each bank’s level of securitization activity. First, 
we calculate the relative size (i.e. as a percentage of total assets) of total securitization 
activity of each bank active in the securitization market between 2000 and 2009. Then we 
calculate two dummy variables, less active and more active, to classify these banks into 
two groups. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is below the 
median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the 
value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is above the median value of all banks’ 
securitization volume and 0 otherwise. 
 We account for bank specific characteristics by taking into account bank size (measured as 
total assets), capital (measured as the ratio of total equity capital to total assets) and profitability 
(measured as return on assets). We also control for factors related to loan characteristics including 
loan size, maturity, guarantees and collateral. Loan size is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
syndicated loan size. Maturity is the duration of the loan in years. Loans with duration shorter than 
1 year are classified as short-term while loans with an initial maturity longer than three years are 
classified as long-term. Guarantee is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the loan is 
guaranteed and 0 otherwise. Collateral is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is any 
collateral pledged for the loan and 0 otherwise. Loan purpose is a set of dummy variables that 
varies according to the purpose of the loan: general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, 
transport finance, corporate control and property finance. 
 We also account for the credit quality of the borrower and its industrial sector via a first set 
of dummy variables reflecting the median credit rating of the borrower as identified by the three 
largest credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch) at the time of issuance.10 
                                                          
10 We standardize the credit ratings using descriptors of each category provided by rating agencies. 
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Business sector is a set of dummy variables related to the business of the borrower.11 Finally, we 
also control for the macro environment including Year dummy variables. 
 We construct our dataset by combining data from three different sources. Securitization 
data are obtained from Dealogic (Bondware), a private commercial data provider, and completed 
with private confidential data on securitization activity obtained from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
which allows us to include also private deals. We have manually matched information on deal-by-
deal securitization issuance to each euro-area originating bank.12 The advantage of using data on 
securitization activity from Bondware and S&P is that the name of the originator, date of issuance 
and deal proceeds are all registered. We include funded ABS securities as well as cash-flow 
(balance-sheet) CDOs issued by euro-area originating banks. Overall the securitization dataset 
covers 10,911 tranches between 2000 and 2009. 
 We expand the database significantly by identifying those syndicated loan deals that were 
eventually securitized. This is done by resorting to a unique database constructed by collecting 
deal-by-deal confidential information from all major European Trustees for all loans issued 
between 2005 and 2009. 1,795 out of 4,652 syndicated loans extended during this period are 
subsequently securitized. 
 Data on syndicated loan deals are obtained from Dealogic (Loanware), a commercial 
database which contains detailed information on syndicated loan contracts. Dealogic provides 
information on each syndicated loan including maturity, loan size, collateral, presence of 
guarantees, loan purpose, identification of the borrower, as well as the number of banks involved 
in the syndicate. The database also indicates the business sector and the credit rating of the 
                                                          
11 Defined as follows: Construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and 
transport. 
12 To our knowledge the existence of government sponsored agencies complicates the creation of such a database matching securitization origination 
to individual banks in the United States. 
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borrower. Finally, banks’ balance sheet and income statement information are obtained from 
Bankscope, a commercial database maintained by International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA) 
and the Brussels-based Bureau van Dijk. 
 In constructing the dataset, we include, first, all syndicated loans for which the main 
variables on loan terms and borrower details are present. Second, we extract the reported 
participant European banks’ names that have been involved in these loan syndicates. Syndicated 
loans’ information at the individual deal level is subsequently matched with extensive data on 
individual banks’ characteristics obtained from Bankscope on a yearly basis. For example if Loan 
i is issued by Bank X, Bank Y and Bank Z in 2007 and Loan j is issued by Bank X and Bank Q in 
2008 then these combinations of loans and banks are matched as follows:  
 
Loan i’s terms and borrower’s data for 2007 + Bank X’s data for 2006 
Loan i’s terms and borrower’s data for 2007 + Bank Y’s data for 2006 
Loan i’s terms and borrower’s data for 2007 + Bank Z’s data for 2006 
Loan j’s terms and borrower’s data for 2008 + Bank X’s data for 2007 
Loan j’s terms and borrower’s data for 2008 + Bank Q’s data for 2007 
 
 Overall this process generated 84,926 deal-matched observations. As indicated, these three 
data sources do not share a unique identifier, all the data is laboriously matched via the banks’ 
names. We present a summary descriptive statistics related to the sample in Table 1. 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline model 
We run the model presented in section 3 that considers the impact of bank securitization activity 
on the price of syndicated loans and progressively introduce controls for bank characteristics while 
employing the two different sets of variables accounting for securitization activity separately. We 
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run our estimates with and without banks’ fixed effects and re-run the model including clustered 
errors at the bank level. 
 Results in Table 2 show that banks active in the securitization market priced their loans 
more aggressively compared to banks that do not securitize their assets. That is we find that 
securitization active is negatively associated with the loan spread. Being more or less active in the 
securitization market does not change the signs of the coefficients. Both groups of banks charge 
lower spreads when compared to banks that are not active in the securitization market. Similarly, 
controlling for bank characteristics does not change the results but suggests that loans with shorter 
maturity and larger size are more aggressively priced. The estimations including bank fixed effects 
show that within securitizing banks most of the relationship between securitization and pricing of 
loans occurs within the group of less active banks (i.e. those less active in the securitization 
market). That is, the group of banks active in the securitization market with a relatively low level 
of activity in this market compared to their peers appears to charge lower spreads compared to 
non-active banks.13 
4.2 Bank size effects 
Next we investigate whether bank size has an influence on pricing. We analyze the size 
effects by dividing the banks into two main groups defined as large and small.14 Results are 
presented in Table 3. For small banks we do not see that being active in the securitization market 
has an impact on loan pricing. Similarly, the variables less active and more active are also not 
relevant for smaller institutions. That is, for small banks securitization activity plays no role on 
loan pricing. In contrast, for larger banks we find a negative relationship between the securitization 
active variable and loan spreads. Larger banks seem to be charging lower spreads when extending 
new loans if they are active in the securitization market. This finding would be consistent with the 
                                                          
13 As a robustness check and to see whether unobserved bank and loan effects influence the results, we run estimations clustering standard errors 
by bank and loan. Results do not change and remain robust in these models. 
14 We group the banks by using the median assets’ size. 
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idea that larger banks might be better able to diversify or manage credit risk and could therefore 
grant credit to borrowers at lower costs. Accordingly, we further develop our framework to include 
the securitization variables accounting for volume of activity. The results for the last two models 
(also in Table 3) show that particularly for larger banks most of the negative impact of 
securitization on loan spreads continues to take place for banks that are active in the securitization 
market but are relatively less active than their peers. Results including bank characteristics suggest 
that larger banks actually price their loans less aggressively than smaller institutions. Overall, then 
the argument emphasizing the possibility of risk diversification does not seem to be corroborated 
by our results. 
4.3 The effect of pre-crisis period 
We also consider how banks’ pricing behavior due to securitization might change in relation to the 
business or credit cycles as there is evidence suggesting that lending standards change significantly 
with macroeconomic conditions (Demyanyk & Van Hemert 2011). In this respect, it is particularly 
important to observe bank behavior for the period prior to the recent credit crisis as it has been 
often advocated that during this period banks increased their risk-taking behavior on many fronts. 
More specifically, it has been argued that banks lowered their lending standards in the years 
leading up to the crisis, a phenomenon that coincided the increases in securitization activity during 
this period. (Maddaloni & Peydró 2011). We observe bank behavior in the pre-crisis period using 
a dummy variable, pre-crisis period, which equals 1 for the period ranging from January 2005 to 
June 2007 and 0 otherwise. To take this analysis one step further, we also interact our pre-crisis 
dummy with the securitization variables. Results are presented in Table 4. 
 For all estimations we find an overwhelmingly negative, systematic and strong relationship 
between the pre-crisis dummy and loan spreads. Banks were charging significantly lower spreads 
prior to the financial crisis compared to the rest of our sample period of analysis. Surprisingly, 
none of the interactions between the securitization activity variables and the pre-crisis period seem 
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to be relevant. All these findings are further confirmed when we split our sample across bank sizes 
(Table 5). The only interesting exception is the significant and negative coefficient for the 
interaction variable pre-crisis * securitization active, which however loses its significance when 
we control for bank fixed effects. Overall we do not find any evidence at the bank level linking 
securitization activity and lending standards measured via the cost of corporate credit in the years 
prior to the financial crisis. 
4.4 Securitized versus non-securitized loans 
We expand the analysis using an individual deal-by-deal database that is able to select among all 
syndicated loans, those deals that were eventually securitized. Our objective is to ascertain whether 
those loans that were securitized were also granted at lower rates than those not securitized. For 
this latter exercise we have a smaller number of observations as compared to earlier tables because 
the dataset includes only the loans that were issued between 2005 and 2009 so the number of 
observations drops compared to the earlier Tables. We estimate the baseline models separately for 
securitized and non-securitized loans. In other words, in order to avoid self-selection issues we 
focus only on institutions which are already active in the securitization market and include only 
those loans that are securitized. Within those loans and for those institutions we consider whether 
more activity at the bank level in the securitization market involves a more aggressive lending 
rates.  
Results (presented in Table 6 under the label securitized loans) are consistent with our previous 
findings. We do not find significant results for more active banks. Instead in this setting we find 
that banks that are less active in the securitization market were pricing loans at lower spreads. For 
non-securitized loans, we also observe similar results. 
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 Table 7 replicates the previous Table but focuses on the larger banks. Findings remain valid 
even for this reduced sample. We find that among banks active in the securitization market, larger 
institutions making less use of the securitization market charge lower loan prices regardless of 
whether they are securitized or not. In large banks underpricing is more prevalent for loans which 
are not securitized and are kept in banks’ books. Indeed the coefficient of the variable less active, 
shows that the negative loan spread due to securitization, decreases from -11.02 basis points to -
21.64 basis points for those loans that are not-securitized. 
 We then examine the impact of the pre-crisis period on loan pricing only for the larger 
institutions by utilizing pre-crisis dummies and interaction variables. The results presented in 
Table 8 show that for securitized loans the variable less active loses its significance and the pre-
crisis dummy variable continues to be negatively related to loan price. We find that the interaction 
variable pre-crisis * less active and pre-crisis * more active is not significant for securitized loans. 
On the other hand, for non-securitized loans the coefficients of the pre-crisis * less active dummy 
variable becomes positively related to spread. Also here, the results are consistent with earlier 
findings suggesting that securitization do not seem to have an impact on loan spreads. 
 One interesting finding regards the estimations for the non-securitized loan sample which 
shows a negative relationship between less active and loan spread. More importantly we observe 
a larger (and significant) coefficient for pre-crisis period dummy variable. The interaction variable 
pre-crisis period * less active is also significant. Although it is reported to be positive, the impact 
of the interaction variable on the dependent variable should be interpreted by combining the 
coefficients of variables pre-crisis period, less active and pre-crisis period * less active [for the 
most controlled estimations this would be (-28.93)+(-97.20)+(22.00) = (-104.13)]. The interaction 
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variable amplifies the impact of securitization activity on the loan price during the buildup period 
before the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
 Overall, we find only somewhat suggestive microeconomic evidence suggesting that 
securitization had an impact on lending standards as measured by the adjusted cost of corporate 
credit on the syndicated loan market. This stands in contrast with evidence for the United States 
on the corporate loan market (see Nadauld & Weisbach 2012). It is however in line with recent 
evidence that suggests that adverse selection problems in loan securitizations may be less severe 
than commonly believed [(Benmelech et al. 2012); (Albertazzi et al. 2015)]. 
 We do, however, find some limited evidence pointing towards more aggressive pricing for 
large banks that are relatively less active in the securitization market. This evidence is broadly in 
line with findings by Instefjord (2005) and Haensel and Krahnen (2007). Tentatively one possible 
explanation for these latter results might be related to reputational factors. Namely, for banks that 
are more active in the securitization market and are regularly originating credit to be securitized, 
their continuity in terms of their fee income (and overall business model) might depend to a large 
extent on maintaining the quality of the assets underlying these deals. Hence in order to preserve 
their reputational capital they might be less likely to be aggressive risk takers by underpricing 
those loans that are to be securitized [(Kawai 2014); (Hartman-Glaser 2011)]. In contrast, banks 
which are less dependent on the securitization market might have a more opportunistic behavior. 
They might price credit risk more aggressively particularly during periods with lower credit risk 
aversion at the macroeconomic level in which there might be stronger investors’ demand for 
securitized assets. 
 Overall our results overwhelmingly suggest that the remarkable increase in price 
aggressiveness in the syndicated loan market in the run up to the 2007-2009 crisis seems to be 
19 
 
mostly driven by macroeconomic factors rather than by the extent or degree of participation in the 
securitization market by individual banks. That is, we do not find that banks, relying more strongly 
on securitization for funding purposes, lowered their lending standards more aggressively than 
their peers during this period. The results at the loan level complement and support our earlier 
findings. Securitized loans sold to other investors through CLOs originated by banks which are 
more active in the securitization market are not priced more aggressively than those originated by 
banks which are less active users of the securitization market for funding purposes. 
 Interestingly loans that are not securitized and kept on the originating banks’ books seem 
to be priced more aggressively than those securitized. This is partly in line with the signaling 
literature that suggests that banks might have an incentive to retain lower quality loans and package 
and sell off to investors better quality ones. [(Greenbaum & Thakor 1987); (DeMarzo 2005); 
(Instefjord 2005)].15 Another possibility is that banks are no more skilled than the financial markets 
in assessing the credit quality of borrowers as loans kept in the originating banks’ books seem to 
have been underpriced by more. 
5. Conclusions 
Securitization has been under intense scrutiny for potentially fueling credit growth by lowering 
credit standards thereby possibly inducing excessive risk taking by banks [(Shin 2009); (Farhi & 
Tirole 2012); (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011)]. We explore the nexus between 
securitization and lending by examining the pricing of new loans by European banks. We pursue 
two complementary approaches that include comprehensive information at the level of individual 
                                                          
15 Overall, the discrepancy in lending standards among securitized and non-securitized loans can arise if there are “unsuspecting” investors unable 
to fully evaluate the credit quality ex-ante (Gennaioli et al. 2012). It could also possible that the investors investing in securitized assets have an 
incentive to herd even if the interest rates on the securitized assets differ from their fundamentals (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). 
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banks and of deals. We construct a wide sample of 84,926 matched bank-loan observations that 
allows us to control for lender, borrower and loan characteristics. In addition, a unique feature of 
our dataset is that we can identify those individual syndicated loan deals that were eventually 
securitized. 
 We do not find that banks active in the securitization market were pricing loans more 
aggressively than other institutions. We do find, however, that large banks that make use of the 
securitization market but are relatively less active in this market than their peers may charge lower 
spreads when extending new loans.  
 Probably more importantly, our findings also show that in the run up to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, banks relying on securitization did not lower their lending standards more 
aggressively than other institutions. That is, banks, making use of the securitization market for 
funding purposes, did not lower the cost on credit in the syndicated loan market more than their 
peers during this period. The results at the loan level complement and support these findings. 
Securitized loans originated by banks which are more active in the securitization market are not 
priced more aggressively than those originated by banks which are less active users of the 
securitization market for funding purposes. 
 Our results seem to point to a limited role for securitization in encouraging more aggressive 
risk-taking by banks while the role played by the credit cycle in lowering credit standards seems 
more economically significant. It is however hard to be conclusive because the large increases in 
securitization activity in most European countries might have contributed in amplifying the credit 
cycle in a manner not fully identifiable at the microeconomic level. From a policy perspective our 
results seem to support the introduction of macro prudential policies aimed at smoothing the credit 
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cycle. Hence, regulatory actions that aim to improve the incentive structure in the securitization 
process probably would need to incorporate the impact of the state of the credit cycle as well. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics1 
          
Bank characteristics Number of banks Mean Median Std. dev. 
All banks         
Total assets 406 116,512 12,717 322,460 
Equity capital to total assets 406 8.41 6.56 9.31 
Return on assets 406 0.64 0.56 1.14 
          
Securitization active banks         
Total assets 94 173,628 31,179 368,487 
Equity capital to total assets 94 7.12 6.41 6.12 
Return on assets 94 0.71 0.63 1.34 
          
Securitization non-active banks         
Total assets 312 79,043 6,830 300,634 
Equity capital to total assets 312 9.56 6.77 11.43 
Return on assets 312 0.61 0.51 1.25 
          
Loan characteristics Number of loans Mean  Median  Std. dev 
Spread 10,911 202 100 167 
Loan amount 10,911 287 165 958 
Maturity 10,911 6.1 5 3.9 
Collateral 10,911 0.31 0 0.46 
Guaranteed 10,911 0.01 0 0.11 
1Total assets are in million EUR. Spread is measured as basis points over LIBOR. Maturity is in years. 
 
23 
 
 
Table 2
Securitization active -7.21*** (0.96) -4.27*** (1.01) -7.47      (5.03) -8.02*     (4.85)
    Less active -7.73*** (1.17) -5.67*** (1.18)   -8.75**  (4.55) -10.08**   (4.92)
    More active -6.74*** (1.17) -2.83**  (1.25) -4.96       (7.96) -4.07        (6.63)
Loan characteristics
    Log loan size -8.86*** (0.28) -8.86*** (0.28) -8.66*** (0.31) -8.66*** (0.31)   -9.81*** (0.89)   -9.81*** (0.89) -9.74*** (1.00) -9.73*** (1.00)
    Maturity short -15.1*** (1.28) -15.08*** (1.28) -15.51*** (1.47) -15.49*** (1.47) -16.53*** (1.74) -16.66*** (5.01) -16.28*** (2.00) -16.18*** (2.04)
    Maturity long 8.41*** (1.00) 8.41*** (1.00) 7.66*** (1.13) 7.65*** (1.11)    7.62*** (1.87)     7.61*** (1.87) 8.26*** (2.08) 8.28*** (2.09)
    Guarantee -4.64*     (2.41) -4.62*    (2.41) -5.58*    (2.87) -5.55*    (2.88)   -6.71      (4.18)    -6.69      (4.17) -9.21*     (5.25) -9.24*    (5.22)
    Collateral 11.36*** (1.20) 11.36*** (1.20) 11.39*** (1.30) 11.36*** (1.30)  10.57*** (2.61)   10.58*** (2.61) 10.96*** (2.83) 10.98*** (2.83)
Bank Characteristics
    Log total assets -1.35*** (0.29) -1.42*** (0.29) 20.25*** (6.10) 20.94*** (6.12)
    Equity to total assets 0.51*** (0.09) 0.52*** (0.09) 0.65      (0.50) 0.68      (0.51)
    Return on assets -2.21*** (0.54) -2.16*** (0.53) -1.81      (3.85) -1.71      (3.86)
Control for:
    Loan purpose
    Borrower credit rating
    Borrower industry
    Year
R-square
F-test (p-values)
Number of observations
Number of groups 406
Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
84926 84926
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8492684926
Yes
Yes
OLS OLS with bank fixed effects
This table reports the coefficient estimates for OLS regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. The dependent variable is the loan spread
measured in basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1
if the bank’s securitization level is below the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is above the median
value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is below one
year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantee takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a third party and
0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank’s total assets. Equity to total assets is calculated as the ratio of total equity
to total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance,
transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is granted. Business Industry is
controlled for using dummy variables categorised as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Year fixed effects is
included for the years 2000 to 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The impact of banks' securitization activity on loan price
406 406
84,926 84,926 84926 84926
406
Yes
(VI) (VII) (VIII)(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
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Table 3
Securitization active -1.75      (9.12) -1.63     (9.47) -9.82*      (5.95) -9.61*      (5.56)
    Less active -1.84     (8.84) 1.73     (9.28) -11.44**  (5.32) -13.05**  (5.69)
    More active -1.48     (15.2) 1.31     (14.4) -6.98       (8.73) -3.77       (7.36)
Loan characteristics
    Log loan size -9.34*** (0.99) -9.34*** (0.99) -9.34*** (0.99) -9.34*** (0.99) -10.16*** (1.27) -9.76*** (1.64) -10.16*** (1.27) -9.75*** (1.65)
    Maturity short -17.77*** (2.11) -17.41*** (2.10) -17.77*** (2.12) -17.39*** (2.12) -16.31*** (1.72) -14.61*** (3.27) -15.55*** (5.61) -14.14*** (3.39)
    Maturity long 9.38*** (2.86) 9.76*** (2.91) 9.38*** (2.87) 9.76*** (2.92) 7.31*** (2.41) 9.94*** (3.47) 7.31*** (2.41) 10.11*** (3.51)
    Guarantee -8.85     (5.97) -9.27     (5.97) -8.86     (5.97) -9.28     (5.97) -4.64       (4.61) -11.02*    (5.99) -4.59       (4.60) -11.14*     (5.97)
    Collateral 5.12     (3.54) 5.44     (3.50) 5.13     (3.53) 5.45     (3.49) 13.81*** (2.97) 15.14*** (3.59) 13.79*** (2.96) 15.11*** (3.58)
Bank Characteristics
    Log total assets 9.55     (6.63) 9.57     (6.68) 54.15*** (12.9) 57.05*** (13.2)
    Equity to total assets -0.15     (0.46) -0.15     (0.46) 13.28*** (0.48) 13.86**  (5.50)
    Return on assets 1.09     (2.58) 1.09     (2.56) -21.68**  (10.4) -21.24*    (10.7)
Control for:
    Loan purpose
    Borrower credit rating
    Borrower industry
    Year
F-test (p-values)
Number of observations
Number of groups
Small banks Large banks
Bank size and the impact of banks' securitization activity on loan price
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports the coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. The dependent variable is the loan spread
measured in basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1 if the 
bank’s securitization level is below the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is above the median value of all
banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Bank size is grouped by using the median assets size. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the
maturity of the loan is below one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantee takes the value of 1 if the loan is
guaranteed by a third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank’s total assets. Equity to total assets is the level
of bank’s total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital
structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is granted.
Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Year
fixed effects is included for the years 2000 to 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
0.000 0.000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
13,772 13,772 13772 13772 71,154 71,154 71,154 71,154
203 203203203 203 203 203 203
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(VIII)
Active in the securitization market Intensity of securitization Active in the securitization market Intensity of securitization
(I) (II) (VII)(III) (IV) (V) (VI)
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Table 4
Securitization active -4.42      (3.06) -4.61      (3.10) -3.10      (3.13) -3.35      (3.28)
    Less active -5.08*    (2.93) -5.54*    (3.12) -4.58      (3.19) -5.22      (3.39)
    More active -3.11      (4.35) -2.88      (4.17) -0.37      (4.33) 0.01      (4.15)
Pre-crisis period -68.91*** (3.12) -67.47*** (3.25) -67.18*** (3.44) -65.85*** (3.59) -68.48*** (3.15) -67.31*** (3.33) -66.59*** (3.52) -64.99*** (3.69)
Pre-crisis period * securitization active -3.33      (3.69) -3.16      (3.92)
Pre-crisis period * less active 2.08     (3.49) -1.62      (3.68)
Pre-crisis period * more active -5.51     (4.69) -5.84      (4.92)
Loan characteristics
    Log loan size -9.21*** (0.95) -9.12*** (1.05) -9.21*** (0.95) -9.12*** (1.05) -9.21*** (0.95) -9.13*** (1.05) -9.21*** (0.95) -7.95*** (0.31)
    Maturity short -14.83*** (1.52) -14.96*** (1.79) -14.84*** (1.52) -14.97*** (1.79) -14.81*** (1.52) -14.91*** (1.81) -14.83*** (1.53) -13.89*** (1.37)
    Maturity long 13.11*** (1.59) 13.23*** (1.77) 13.12*** (1.59) 13.25*** (1.77) 13.12*** (1.53) 13.23*** (1.78) 13.12*** (1.58) 13.65*** (1.04)
    Guarantee -9.11*** (3.71) -11.94**  (4.76) -9.12**  (3.72) -11.91**  (4.76) -9.11**  (3.72) -11.95**  (4.76) -9.11**  (3.72) -8.54*** (2.64)
    Collateral 13.14*** (2.59) 12.41*** (2.82) 12.38*** (2.61) 12.42*** (2.83) 12.38*** (2.61) 12.42*** (2.83) 12.39*** (2.61) 13.21*** (1.31)
Bank Characteristics
    Log total assets 5.72     (3.88) 5.62 (3.95) 6.06      (3.91) 6.26      (3.98)
    Equity to total assets 0.04     (0.35) 0.04 (0.35) 0.06      (0.35) 0.06      (0.35)
    Return on assets -0.19     (2.40) -0.22 (2.40) -0.14      (2.41) -0.13      (2.42)
Control for:
    Loan purpose
    Borrower credit rating
    Borrower industry
    Year
F-test (p-values)
Number of observations
Number of groups
Pre-crisis bank securitization activity and loan price
This table reports the coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. The dependent variable is the loan spread measured in
basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization
level is below the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is above the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0
otherwise. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Pre-crisis period takes the value of 1 for the loans issued in 2005, 2006 and the first six months of 2007 and 0 otherwise. Maturity short
takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is below one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantee takes the value of 1 if
the loan is guaranteed by a third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank’s total assets. Equity to total assets is the level
of bank’s total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital structure,
project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is granted. Business Industry is
controlled for using dummy variables categorised as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Year fixed effects is included for the
years 2000-2004 and 2008-2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Active in the securitization market Intensity of securitization
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.000 0.000
84,926 84,926 84,926 84,926 84,926 84,926 84,926 84,926
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
406 406406 406 406 406 406 406
(VI) (VII) (VIII)(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
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Table 5
Bank size and the impact of securitization activity on loan price during the pre-crisis period
Securitization active 3.01      (6.54) 4.21      (3.68) -5.27      (3.58) -5.66      (3.86)
    Less active 1.55      (5.17) 1.72      (5.29) -7.08*    (3.74) -8.28*    (4.25)
    More active 10.04      (20.6) 10.19      (20.3) -2.23      (4.92) -1.25      (4.59)
Pre-crisis period -74.38*** (5.36) -74.45*** (4.84) -73.33*** (6.17) -73.24*** (5.76) -66.35*** (3.99) -62.01*** (4.46) -65.63*** (4.03) -60.78*** (4.34)
Pre-crisis period * securitization active -12.61*     (6.84) -9.77      (7.48) -1.73      (3.99) -0.36       (7.04)
Pre-crisis period * less active -8.18      (7.29) -7.11      (7.93) -0.31      (3.94) -1.07      (4.15)
Pre-crisis period * more active -21.32      (20.4) -18.81      (20.7) -4.14      (4.78) -3.34      (5.34)
Loan characteristics
    Log loan size -8.85*** (0.99) -8.85*** (1.00) -8.85*** (0.99) -8.85*** (1.00) -9.48*** (1.36) -9.24*** (1.69) -9.48*** (1.36) -9.26*** (1.69)
    Maturity short -17.06*** (1.95) -16.95*** (1.95) -17.06*** (1.95) -16.96*** (1.96) -13.52*** (2.29) -13.22*** (3.04) -13.49*** (2.31) -13.03*** (3.11)
    Maturity long 13.11*** (2.51) 13.04*** (2.54) 13.11*** (2.51) 13.04*** (2.54) 13.36*** (2.04) 14.28*** (2.86) 13.33*** (2.03) 14.28*** (2.86)
    Guarantee -12.04**  (5.66) -11.97**  (5.66) -12.03**  (5.66) -11.96**  (5.66) -6.85*    (3.98) -13.06**  (5.49) -6.77*    (3.98) -12.99**  (5.53)
    Collateral 6.67*    (3.57) 6.79*    (3.55) 6.67*    (3.56) 6.79*    (3.54) 15.64*** (3.00) 15.14*** (3.59) 15.65*** (3.00) 16.31*** (3.64)
Bank Characteristics
    Log total assets 0.24      (4.01) 9.57      (6.68) 29.63*** (8.37) 57.05*** (13.2)
    Equity to total assets -0.44      (0.33) -0.15      (0.46) 8.71**  (4.06) 13.86**  (5.50)
    Return on assets 1.32      (1.68) 1.09      (2.56) -12.77*    (7.16) -21.24*    (10.7)
Control for:
    Loan purpose
    Borrower credit rating
    Borrower industry
    Year
F-test (p-values)
Number of observations
Number of groups
This table reports the coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans. The dependent variable is the loan spread measured in
basis points over LIBOR. Securitization active takes the value of 1 if the bank securitised any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level 
is below the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is above the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0
otherwise. Bank size is grouped by using the median assets size. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Pre-crisis period takes the value of 1 for the loans issued in 2005, 2006 and the first six
months of 2007 and 0 otherwise. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is below one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is more than three year
and 0 otherwise. Guarantee takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank’s
total assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank’s total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as
general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the
loan is granted. Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Year
fixed effects is included for the years 2000-2004 and 2008-2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Small banks
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Large banks
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
203
Yes Yes
203203203
0.000
13,772 13,772 13,772 13,772
0.000 0.000 0.000
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes Yes
71,154
203 203 203 203
71,154 71,154 71,154
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yes Yes
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Active in the securitization market Intensity of securitization Active in the securitization market Intensity of securitization
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
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Table 6
Securitized versus non-securitized loans
Less active -14.96*    (7.99) -13.49**  (6.50) -31.33**  (15.9) -23.88**  (10.6)
More active -8.22      (11.3) -3.74      (9.01) -11.23      (22.6) -3.97      (11.5)
Loan characteristics
    Log loan size -10.98*** (1.34) -11.06*** (1.36) -8.73*** (0.99) -7.54*** (1.36)
    Maturity short -19.36*** (7.33) -11.34      (7.94) -18.76*** (4.38) -11.21*** (5.02)
    Maturity long -13.35**  (5.51) -2.49      (6.13) -25.58*** (3.26) 13.61*** (4.14)
    Guarantee -77.53*** (12.6) -91.29*** (13.6) 25.21*** (9.39) 12.51      (9.63)
    Collateral -37.15*** (4.72) -34.81*** (4.81) 3.29      (3.79) 8.58*     (4.38)
Bank Characteristics
    Log total assets 64.43*** (13.4) 127.16*** (27.8)
    Equity to total assets 1.24      (0.94) 3.57      (2.63)
    Return on assets -5.24**  (2.36) -15.39**  (6.92)
Control for:
    Loan purpose
    Borrower credit rating
    Borrower industry
    Year
F-test (p-values)
Number of observations
Number of groups
22,403
94
22,403
94
Securitized loans Non-securitized loans
0.000 0.000
17,087
94
17,087
94
Yes Yes
0.000 0.000
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
This table reports the coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization
activity on the price of syndicated loans. The dependent variable is the loan spread measured in basis points over LIBOR. Less
active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is below the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0
otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is above the median value of all banks’
securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Maturity short takes
the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is below one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1 if the maturity
of the loan is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantee takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a third party and
0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank’s
total assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank’s total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income
divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital
structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for
using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is granted. Business Industry is controlled for using dummy
variables categorised as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state,
manufacturing and transport. Year fixed effects is included for the years 2005 to 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Yes YesYesYes
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
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Table 7
Securitized versus non-securitized loans in large banks
Less active -15.01*    (8.62) -11.02*    (6.41) -36.04**  (17.8) -21.64**  (11.1)
More active -8.69      (10.2) -1.23      (8.42) -16.22      (23.1) -2.98       (9.43)
Loan characteristics
    Log loan size -10.44*** (1.39) -10.86*** (1.35) -8.72*** (1.11) -6.46*** (1.41)
    Maturity short -33.31**  (5.19) -6.21       (8.41) -18.29*** (4.91) -5.49      (4.55)
    Maturity long -13.17**  (6.08) 3.02       (6.35) -24.02*** (3.84) -7.77**  (3.09)
    Guarantee -67.88*** (13.4) -17.26**  (8.17) 34.13**  (10.9) 10.05      (9.52)
    Collateral -33.31*** (5.19) 13.96*** (4.82) 5.89       (4.01) -11.80**  (4.56)
Bank Characteristics
    Log total assets 96.03*** (14.5) 175.09*** (13.8)
    Equity to total assets 5.37      (4.14) 9.99       (6.10)
    Return on assets -7.25      (6.77) -22.52**   (9.88)
Control for:
    Loan purpose
    Borrower credit rating
    Borrower industry
    Year
F-test (p-values)
Number of observations
Number of groups
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
47 47
0.000
19,128
0.000
19,128
47
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.000
14,379
47
Yes
Yes
14,379
0.000
Securitized loans Non-securitized loans
This table reports the coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity
on the price of syndicated loans. The dependent variable is the loan spread measured in basis points over LIBOR. Less active takes
the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is below the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More
active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s securitization level is above the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0
otherwise. Bank size is grouped by using the median assets size. Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan.
Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is below one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long takes the value of 1
if the maturity of the loan is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantee takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a
third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the
logarithm of bank’s total assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank’s total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is
the net income divided by total assets. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use,
capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled
for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is granted. Business Industry is controlled for using dummy
variables categorised as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state,
manufacturing and transport. Year fixed effects is included for the years 2005 to 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Yes
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
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Table 8
Securitized versus non-securitized loans in large banks during pre-crisis period
Less active -9.31      (16.6) -11.25      (15.6) -24.82*** (9.07) -28.93*** (9.86)
More active -5.53      (7.44) -3.33      (7.44) -9.08      (8.25) -8.34      (7.76)
Pre-crisis period -68.68*** (8.15) -54.27*** (9.92) -126.27*** (7.34) -97.20*** (7.34)
Pre-crisis period * less active 4.47      (19.1) 6.71      (18.1) 17.33*    (9.43) 22.00**  (10.0)
Pre-crisis period * more active 0.87      (9.04) 1.78      (9.01) -2.20      (8.89) 2.07      (8.99)
Loan characteristics
    Log loan size -11.14*** (1.36) -11.22*** (1.34) -6.22*** (1.33) -6.03*** (1.36)
    Maturity short -2.21      (8.29) 0.84      (8.34) -2.19      (4.28) -1.68      (4.25)
    Maturity long 9.13      (5.81) 12.69**  (5.98) -3.72      (3.16) -3.05      (3.28)
    Guarantee -102.78*** (14.5) -107.85*** (14.7) 6.41      (8.72) 4.66      (8.79)
    Collateral -31.03*** (5.14) -30.52*** (5.17) 11.84**  (4.59) 12.50*** (4.61)
Bank Characteristics
    Log total assets 49.07*** (13.3) 64.79*** (12.2)
    Equity to total assets 2.32      (3.00) 1.70      (3.51)
    Return on assets -5.42      (4.82) -6.90      (6.23)
Control for:
    Loan purpose
    Borrower credit rating
    Borrower industry
F-test (p-values)
Number of observations
Number of groups
14,379 14,379 19,128 19,128
47 47 47 47
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the coefficient estimates for OLS fixed effects regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of
syndicated loans. The dependent variable is the loan spread measured in basis points over LIBOR. Less active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s
securitization level is below the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. More active takes the value of 1 if the bank’s
securitization level is above the median value of all banks’ securitization volume and 0 otherwise. Bank size is grouped by using the median assets size.
Log loan size is the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan. Pre-crisis period takes the value of 1 for the loans issued in 2005, 2006 and the first
six months of 2007 and 0 otherwise. Maturity short takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is below one year and 0 otherwise. Maturity long
takes the value of 1 if the maturity of the loan is more than three year and 0 otherwise. Guarantee takes the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed by a
third party and 0 otherwise. Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan has collateral and 0 otherwise. Log total assets is the logarithm of bank’s total
assets. Equity to total assets is the level of bank’s total equity divided by total assets. Return on assets is the net income divided by total assets. Loan
purpose is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate
control and property finance. Borrower credit quality is controlled for using credit rating assigned to the borrower in the year when the loan is granted.
Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables categorised as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population
related services, state, manufacturing and transport. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Securitized loans Non-securitized loans
Yes Yes Yes Yes
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
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